Reversible Molecular Computing Tuesday, Nov 28 2006
nanotechnology 9:08 am
Found on John Baez’s weekly finds in mathematical physics:
K. Eric Drexler writes:
Dear John,
John Baez wrote:
> […] with a perfectly tuned dynamics, an analogue system
> can act perfectly digital, since each macrostate gets
> mapped perfectly into another one with each click of
> the clock. But with imperfect dynamics, dissipation
> is needed to squeeze each macrostate down enough so it
> can get mapped into the next - and the dissipation
> makes the dynamics irreversible, so we have to pay a
> thermodynamic cost.Logically reversible computation can, in fact, be kept on track without expending energy and without accurately tuned dynamics. A logically reversible computation can be embodied in a constraint system resembling a puzzle with sliding, interlocking pieces, in which all configurations accessible from a given input state correspond to admissible states of the computation along an oriented path to the output configuration. The computation is kept on track by the contact forces that constrain the motion of the sliding pieces. The computational state is then like a ball rolling along a deep trough; an error would correspond to the ball jumping out of the trough, but the energy barrier can be made high enough to make the error rate negligible. Bounded sideways motion (that is, motion in computationally irrelevant degrees of freedom) is acceptable and inevitable.
Keeping a computation of this sort on track clearly requires no energy expenditure, but moving the computational state in a preferred direction (forward!) is another matter. This requires a driving force, and in physically realistic systems, this force will be resisted by a “friction” caused by imperfections in dynamics that couple motion along the progress coordinate to motion in other, computationally irrelevant degrees of freedom. In a broad class of physically realistic systems, this friction scales like viscous drag: the magnitude of the mean force is proportional to speed, hence energy dissipation per distance travelled (equivalently, dissipation per logic operation) approaches zero as the speed approaches zero.
Thus, the thermodynamic cost of keeping a classical computation free of errors can be zero, and the thermodynamic cost per operation of a logically reversible computation can approach zero. Only Landauer’s ln(2)kT cost of bit erasure is unavoidable, and the number of bits erased is a measure of how far a computation deviates from logical reversibility. These results are well-known from the literature, and are important in understanding what can be done with atomically-precise systems.
With best wishes,
Eric
For an introduction to Drexler’s plans for atomically-precise reversible computers, see:
28) K. Eric Drexler, Nanosystems: Molecular Machinery, Manufacturing, and Computation, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1992.
The issue of heat dissipation in such devices is also studied here:
29) Ralph C. Merkle, Two types of mechanical reversible logic, Nanotechnology 4 (1993), 114-131. Also available at http://www.zyvex.com/nanotech/mechano.html
I need to think about this stuff more!
The upshot of this is that by running our minds on reversible molecular computers, we can live forever and expend no energy.
Anthropics alert: if this is so, why weren’t we born in the future era of infinite free computation and lifespan?
Answer: we still know practically nothing about the physical delineations of our reference class, so we can’t say what the probability distribution of our likelihood of birth looks like with much accuracy.
Read more on reversibility from Robin Hanson and anthropics from Milan M. Cirkovic.

November 28th, 2006 at 10:48 am
> The upshot of this is that by running our minds on reversible molecular computers, we can live forever and expend no energy.
That is NOT true. You need to maintain the system, at least. So a story ends one day, when the energy is depleted or (what’s the same) turned into heat.
But yes, you could last longer, much longer with this kind of ride through time.
November 28th, 2006 at 11:10 am
> Answer: we still know practically nothing about the physical delineations of our reference class, so we can’t say what the probability distribution of our likelihood of birth looks like with much accuracy
Well, I am almost certain that you were born. Do you assign a different probability?
It sounds like you think that these “reference classes” and “probability distributions” are physical objects that we can learn stuff about. Really, a probability distribution is just something in your head that you use to make predictions.
November 28th, 2006 at 12:22 pm
Peter,
For “my probability distribution of the likelihood of my birth”, I mean, I don’t know whether it is inherently more likely for me to be born along with 5 billion other humans or 5 trillion. And “reference class” really could be an objective thing, clearly there seems to be a delineation between SAS (self aware subsystems) in the universe and those that are not. Tegmark has a really long and good paper on this.
According to the SSA, I have to assume I’m typical, and was born when a typical person was born, meaning that more than likely the largest population exists today, and tens of additional billions won’t be born, because if they would then it would be more likely for me to be born then, so either 1) future people are in a different reference class, or 2) the Doomsday Argument holds. Because 2 is so unpleasant, speculation in the direction of 1 is quite natural.
A reference class might really be a natural kind that we can learn stuff about, don’t you think? A probability distribution, of course, is just a fancy way of saying “guess”.
There’s (hopefully) no Mind Projection Fallacy in my general way of thinking…
November 28th, 2006 at 2:58 pm
“According to the SSA, I have to assume I’m typical, and was born when a typical person was born, meaning that more than likely the largest population exists today”
I’m opposed to this line of reasoning for two reasons. First, you should be asking what the likelihood is that you as a molecular aggregation would be alive today, rather than you as a generic person. It seems to me that physical determinism, while it has been challenged by recent evidence, has yet to be disproven. I believe that unpredictability at the quantum level merely reflects our ignorance of the laws at that level, rather than an actual lack of said laws.
Another objection I have is that anthropic arguments take the arguer out of the equation, as if he wasn’t there to conjure the argument in the first place, eventhough he clearly is. Anthropic arguments, then, seem to be implicitly contradictory.
November 28th, 2006 at 3:15 pm
I may be a molecular aggregation, sure, but it makes no difference to the Self-Sampling Assumption. I agree with you about the quantum level, on grounds of MWI determinism, and t’Hooft’s arguments, and our historically demonstrated propensity to mistake uncertainty in our minds for uncertainty in reality itself.
Still, the notion of an observer is very important in anthropics… in fact, it’s the centerpiece of anthropics, and observers play a special role, even if they’re ‘only’ a particular molecular aggregation.
How would anthropic arguments be different even if we add ourselves into the equation? The same laws of probability still hold. Dutch book arguments do a really good job of showing that when we start arbitrarily disobeying these laws due to observer-biased reasons, we not only are ignoring reality, but ultimately putting ourselves in a losing position with respect to making bets about our actual circumstances.
D, you should take a look at the primary literature on the anthropic principle if you still haven’t. (Or ideally the book.) There are many arguments pro and con on many anthropic theories, and some anthropic arguments are so obvious that many regard them as tautological… like the “laws of physics must allow life”… so when you say “(all) anthropic arguments seem implicitly contradictory”, it makes me inclined to take you less seriously…
November 28th, 2006 at 5:51 pm
Ok I have a question about this Self Sampling Assumption.
Let’s go back say 10,000 years, when the human populaiton is estimated to be around 4-5 million. Based on the SSA, wouldn’t a person at that time have to assume he is part of the peak population? Yet now we know that person would have been utterly false.
November 28th, 2006 at 9:39 pm
Ryan raises an important point: SSA is necessarily relativized (epistemically) to a “current” population, whenever “current” may happen to be, chronologically-speaking. This is axiomatic (or at least metaphysically/epistemically necessary). So it’s not especially a weakness per se. But it must be taken into account whenever the SSA is “deployed” (or discussed…).
Setting aside the Doomsday Possibility for the nonce, one might not-unreasonably posit a population of a trillion “persons” throughout the solar system, once tech trends allow this to be instantiated. But then we have to re-think and take into account that IF a techno-Singularity occurs, meaning by the term “Singularity” in this instance *not* merely attainment-of-greater-than-human-self-enhancing-intelligence, but also a rapid (quite possibly very rapid) convergence/development of maximal technology (whatever that turns-out to be, femto-, atto- or beyond), then the very *categories* in terms of which the SSA was originally contemplated and “deployed” may have changed so radically that it becomes a bit like Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* was once characterized (by LW himself), a ladder (i.e., an instrument) that, once climbed, could be kicked-away (having served its function…).
November 29th, 2006 at 6:01 am
Ryan, that is correct. There are also other bizarre consequences that could come from the SSA. But still, most of the obvious objections against it have been shown to be groundless.
It is indeed possible, but highly unlikely, that we really are only the first 1% of humanity. But the first .1%? Or the first .01%? It gets progressively less likely, the more unique of a situation you try to put yourself in.
November 29th, 2006 at 1:03 pm
“D, you should take a look at the primary literature on the anthropic principle if you still haven’t.”
Indeed, I know nothing about the literature in this field. Thus, it may be best to ignore my second argument, as this might have been addressed in the literature a million times.
My first argument, however, the one concerning physical determinism, is simply an extension of physics. I will elaborate on that here because I don’t think I made my case clearly enough the first time. Here’s the argument:
1) You are the *unique* chemcial product of a long path of chemical reactions; beginning at the Big Bang.
2) You are “alive” now because said path of chemical reactions led to your materialization at this point in time.
3) You could not be alive at another time because then the path of chemical reactions that led to you would be different, and you would not be you, but a different person.
-end of argument-
You say: “It is indeed possible, but highly unlikely, that we really are only the first 1% of humanity. But the first .1%? Or the first .01%? It gets progressively less likely…”
How about this:
1) You are an organism.
2) A bacterium is an organism.
3) There are 6.5 billion people in the world.
4) There are 5 million trillion trillion bacteria in the world.
5) If you are a typical organism it is orders of magnitude more likely that you are a bacterium than that you are a human.
Obviously this argument is false for the same reason that the argument is false that “It is indeed possible, but highly unlikely, that we really are only the first 1% of humanity. But the first .1%? Or the first .01%? It gets progressively less likely…”
November 29th, 2006 at 3:40 pm
D, I understand why the SSA seems counterintuitive, but really, read a serious introduction to it before you make up a rebuttal.
Bacteria aren’t conscious, so there’s no way I could consciously say “I am a bacterium”.
Happy to have you commenting on the topic, though.
November 30th, 2006 at 1:48 am
“…but really, read a serious introduction to it before you make up a rebuttal.”
Point well taken. BTW, I thoroughly enjoy your blog, and congratulate you (though belatedly) on the blog’s one year aniversary.
November 30th, 2006 at 8:40 am
Thanks! And I appreciate your comments, the discussions really make this blog interesting.