Hellman’s Nuclear Weapons Paper Saturday, Jan 31 2009
Most people are afraid to discuss major risks like nuclear war because they are not intellectually sophisticated enough to contemplate such a disturbing possibility in an objective manner. They may not even be consciously afraid, but still immediately twitch away from contemplating the subject due to a mostly subconscious emotional reaction. They may also place excessive faith in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, even though the myriad ways in which this scenario could break down are thoroughly familiar to defense analysts.
To come to terms with this reality, Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Stanford and one of the inventors of public key cryptography, Martin Hellman, wrote a piece last July titled “Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear Weapons”. This paper approaches the issue of nuclear war risk from the perspective of something less threatening: gliding. I suggest you check it out.
For a concurrent view, see former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s “Apocalypse Soon” from Foreign Policy magazine. Here’s a couple quotes:
“On any given day, as we go about our business, the president is prepared to make a decision within 20 minutes that could launch one of the most devastating weapons in the world. To declare war requires an act of congress, but to launch a nuclear holocaust requires 20 minutes’ deliberation by the president and his advisors. But that is what we have lived with for 40 years.”
“There is no guarantee against unlimited escalation once the first nuclear strike occurs.”
I think the problem of nuclear apocalypse is just too enormous for most people to wrap their heads around; they just don’t want to think about it, which in my view, and despite how long we have lived with the bomb, only contributes to increased existential risk
as a sidebar: your post on uploading was excellent; I found it interesting and stimulating; more, please
Looks kinda sloppy to me. The prior probability for the yearly risk of nuclear war is concentrated near zero and is not uniform as both confidence intervals and Laplace’s rule of succession assume. Also 50 consecutive successes are strong Bayesian evidence that the risk during the cold war wasn’t larger than maybe 1-2% and weaker Bayesian evidence that it was smaller than 1%. If the risk now is (I’m just randomly guessing here but I don’t see Hellman arguing that it’s stayed the same, maybe I’m wrong) one fifth of what it was during the cold war, then we can be confident it’s less than .2% per year.
Also, Hellman doesn’t distinguish between the use of a nuclear weapon, full-scale nuclear war, and the end of the world, which are three different things.
In my own experience, most people are willing to discuss the issue and many possess the intellectual sophistication to consider it objectively. The greatest cause for disinterest is the feeling that it’s all been said before. Yes, the nuclear threat is real. No, it’s not going away. No, the situation hasn’t changed recently. Conversation over.
Potential threats such as hostile AI, nanotech, misuse of genetic profiling, etc, are all more attractive subjects for discussion because the threats haven’t actualised yet and could still arrive in different forms requiring different responses – there is scope for discussion.
The nuclear threat is like the flu – more dangerous than people give it credit, but familiarity breeds complacency and contempt.
Michael, this is the single most hubristic thing I’ve ever seen you write. I would dare to say that there are those whom would find it offensive.
>Michael, this is the single most hubristic thing
>I’ve ever seen you write. I would dare to say
>that there are those whom would find it
>offensive.
It IS a little, “people only disagree with me because they are stupid” isn’t it?
For myself, I agree with Steven above, the linked study is less convincing than it might be. It’s a little monolithic, and his “intuitive” approaches to boundaries and base probabilities is a little wild.
Steven, good points. What Hellman seems to be implying is that the risk is slightly lower than in the Cold War but not by much. You’re right that Hellman treats the three possibilities too similarly when he shouldn’t — essentially it seems like he believes that any use of a nuclear weapon has a substantial likelihood of building up into full-scale nuclear war.
After reading both the papers (by Hellman and McNamara), I’ve decided I like the McNamara one better, because it makes less quantitative claims and is more about sharing his personal experiences.
Chris, I think that only applies in the more intellectual communities… for them, your analysis makes sense. Personally, I’ve ran across far more people expressing the view mentioned by Hellman, that the risk went to practically zero when the Cold War ended, than expressing the view that the risk still exists but we can’t say anything new about it.
Ian, thanks. I feel strongly about this issue, and I think jarring people into thinking about it (even if I offend them in the process) is a good thing.
Are you confident that more people are jarred into thinking by the offense than immediately tune out? I’d bet against it.
They can tune out if they want, people who are that intellectually weak wouldn’t have much to contribute to the conversation anyway.
Justin, people can disagree with me whenever they want, but if they are afraid to ever discuss the possibility of nuclear war (as many are), then they’re intellectually facile. I’m not saying they have to be convinced it’s a huge risk, just that they’re willing to discuss it at all. (Not even necessarily with me.)
Good post. Do you feel that the nuclear threat is more important or probable than a weaponized smallpox or some other bioweapon? Your posts tend to emphasis the long running and looming nuclear threat. As your post said it takes 20 minutes to start nuclear holocaust, a weaponized bioweapon would take longer to produce but would require only one scientist determined enough to wreak havoc in service of whatever ideology drives themselves.
Even people not personally insulted may be put off by the attitude (I was immediately upon reading that sentence). It’s not obvious to me that tolerance of this has much to do with ability to contribute.
Just be careful with that, man. I recently ran into a situation where, using the same sensibility/approach, I actually drove someone out of the process altogether.
It is a tactic that excludes, rather than includes. Rather than say that they are afraid (which is confrontational) say that they are “unaware”, or “underinformed”. There’s such a thing as Rational Ignorance, after all — if it’s that unlikely, based on history, why should they care? It’s our job to sell ‘em on caring. :)
The Foresight Exchange estimates 40-50% for the use of a nuke by 2020; that’s not necessarily trustworthy or close, but probably when I said 1/5 now vs cold war it was too low, especially if you include small nuclear wars.
If you can’t say that someone isn’t intellectually sophisticated enough to do X, then the whole concept of intellectual sophistication isn’t PC any more. That is BS. That’s just what the mainstream wants. F that!
“If you can’t say that someone isn’t intellectually sophisticated enough to do X, then the whole concept of intellectual sophistication isn’t PC any more. That is BS. That’s just what the mainstream wants. F that!”
Precisely.
The vibe that you give off is that you are a young, dumb kid, who isn’t mature enough or diplomatic enough to have a serious discussion. I don’t see why anyone in the policy community would give you the time of day, with your attitude.
Why do you even care about PCness?
Saying someone isn’t intellectually sophisticated in conversation is denigrating their intelligence. Nobody likes to be called unintelligent — especially by someone using “fancy words” to do it.
It’s a non-winner, man. Just sayin’.
Their choice.
That’s exactly the point. I don’t.
But it’s not just you and them who suffer the consequences.
Sigh! Fair enough. Point taken.