Contained Biodisaster for Risk Analysis Saturday, Apr 25 2009
risks 3:27 pm
Chris Phoenix says he found a dangerous area of biotech research, hopefully it is no big deal.
The other day a conversation with John Hunt reminded me of an idea we’ve visited before: that the only way that the world at large will take the biotech risk seriously is if an exceptionally virulent engineered pathogen is released in a controlled space, like a level 4 containment facility, with the intention of killing a specific test species.
This idea sounds sort of bad because it involves killing animals (which is usually a bad idea, as Joshua Greene would say: “boo to killing!”), but perhaps mice would do. If people cared about mice, we wouldn’t have allowed the existence of a billion cats.
More generally, the point here is not the specific idea, but just to come up with ideas, because time is elapsing and we aren’t getting any wiser or more compassionate, just more powerful. Synthetic biology is receiving a tremendous amount of scientific attention and research money with zero oversight. Please: regulate. I have semi-Luddite tendencies when it comes to developing technologies that are potentially omnicidal, even if the risk is relatively low. That puts me into direct conflict with those who want no controls on technological development.
Meanwhile, the environmentalist crowd might complain at the idea of “sinking so low” as to create a deadly microbe which may have some chance, however small, of escaping its containment unit. However, I’d say that the risk is worth it. Biodefense research labs are already operating with thousands of scientists over decades of research with thousands of deadly pathogens and security is compromised only extremely rarely. (Does anyone know of such incidents? Seems like something that would have happened in the Soviet Union at least a few times, in fact I recall that there is an abandoned facility right now somewhere in Siberia.) If the skeptics are right, the microbe won’t be very successful anyway, but if the skeptics are wrong, then that information would be crucial to know so we could put more resources into biodefense against novel arbitrary pathogens.
This experiment can please both the skeptics and the the “doomsayers” (I prefer to call myself “extinction risk concerned”). The skeptics will either see the failure of the engineered pathogen to successfully infect and kill all animals in the chamber, or the success. (Obviously.) If they see failure, their position will get some degree of positive evidence in its favor, depending on the exact circumstances. If they see success, the evidence will be against them. Similarly, the “worriers” can be assuaged by repeated failures in the experiment or strengthen their concern if the experiment kills most/all animals in the chamber.
Really, this does make me squirmy, because I’m mostly against killing animals for research. Perhaps we could start the experiment with worms, but unfortunately the publicity element is all-important and worms would not have the proper evidence-generating effect.
This all goes back to that principle that eventually (especially on matters of controversy) you have to design an experiment of some kind that produces evidence about something, whatever that may be. (The process of subsequent analysis perpetually continues.) Saying Professor Y said one thing and Dr. Z said another endlessly is ultimately just a recycling of old information and opinions, though some Professors may have large lists of references to prop up their positions. Historically, we know experiments settle scientific questions better.
So, if someone wants to step up to the plate and fund this idea, just contact me and I’ll look at my network of contacts to see if there’s anyone interested in actually doing it, and how difficult the ethical approval process would be. (Or just pick it up and run with it yourself.) Does anyone know if any school in the West would even allow this sort of thing? I talked to some official who was in charge of ethical screening for research projects at a university sometime last year and we had some fun conversation, but I hadn’t thought of this idea yet, so I didn’t bring it up.
“Massacring worm cities with bio-engineered pathogens: It seemed like a good idea at the time!”




There have already been accidents with bio and chemical weapons, they haven’t really changed anyone’s stance on them, because we already know, on some level, that they are horrifically deadly and dangerous.
The problem with looking for more evidence to present to people is that they’ll process that evidence via the opinions you’re trying to change in them.
The headline Deadly Designer Microbe Kills Everything Inside Test Lab becomes the headline L4 Lab Microbial Defenses Proof Against Worst Imaginable Bio-Attack, reassuring pro-bio research folk that not only are our safeguards sufficient, but they’re sufficiently good that we can chance partially releasing the worst thing that anti folks like you can dream up.
Let’s distinguish between threats from infectious pathogens, whether wholly natural or partially altered, and threats from novel free-living replicators. Everyone knows about the previous type of threat, it’s as old as history and we have a new-disease scare every few years. Compared to nature’s arsenal, bioweapons are just a slight retooling. It’s the second class of threat – of artificial or semi-artificial life – is the unrecognized one.
In terms of this distinction, I am not clear about the objectives of the proposed gruesome demonstration. Is the idea that the animals are killed by a bioweapon? That won’t do anything to highlight the second class of threat. Is the idea that the animals are killed by a nanoweapon or other truly exotic replicator? The problem there is that bioweapons are likely to kill more directly and efficiently. A nanoweapon might kill indirectly, by fouling the environment and just generally poisoning food, water or air (unless it is meant to be highly specific in its action, perhaps entering the victim in inert form and then activating lethally once it encounters the right molecular trigger).
Anyway, I’d like to be clearer on the objective, first of all. Is the objective to scare into existence some awareness of the need for tighter regulation of synthetic biology (in the broadest possible sense)?
We must distinguish between an experiment and a demonstration. This is absolutely critical. The goal of a demonstration is to impress the public – which means that the scientists performing the demonstration must be under no uncertainty as to what the outcome will be.
The goal of an experiment is to find out new things. In this case, the experimenters won’t know what the outcome will be.
I think that a demonstration is what this post is really aiming at, but I think that it will be hard to find funding for this. A demonstration is a PR exercise, and at the moment no-one that I know of is willing to pour cash into PR for the future of the human race. I would encourage any rich philanthropists out there to fund this, though. You will be remembered in years to come!
Other than that – I strongly support this idea!
The key goal would be a demonstration which would be safe but sufficiently scary in its implications such that it would produce actions which would at least delay the threat of extinction until survival strategies are employed.
We don’t need to be wedded to the idea of a pathogen, nanobot, L4 containment or any other specific. Whatever achieves the above goal is the goal. So what we really need is the right idea.
Would killing mice with a new pathogen generate sufficient PR resulting in action? No? Then what about a pathogen which demonstrates the ability to destroy human lung cell tissue cultures? No? What about establishing an xPrize for the first researchers who demonstrate the ability to selectively kill an entire species? No?
If not, then what will it take for people to take extinction risks seriously? That’s why we need good ideas?
It seems that the emerging swine flu and potential pandemic in Mexico, Canada and the USA had been reading this blog. Only problem is, this one is for real. I hope this isn’t my last comment on accelerating future…
[...] me repeat the call I made just a few days ago, right before the swine flu was in the news, for a demonstration or experiment of a genetically [...]
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