Last September, Kevin Kelly posted a critique of a hard takeoff Singularity, based on what he calls “thinkism”:

As an essay called Why Work Toward the Singularity lets slip: “Even humans could probably solve those difficulties given hundreds of years to think about it.” In this approach one only has to think about problems smartly enough to solve them. I call that “thinkism.”

Let’s take curing cancer or prolonging longevity. These are problems that thinking along cannot solve. No amount of thinkism will discover how the cell ages, or how telomeres fall off. No intelligence, no matter how super duper, can figure out how human body works simply by reading all the known scientific literature in the world and then contemplating it. No super AI can simply think about all the current and past nuclear fission experiments and then come up with working nuclear fusion in a day. Between not knowing how things work and knowing how they work is a lot more than thinkism. There are tons of experiments in the real world which yields tons and tons of data that will be required to form the correct working hypothesis. Thinking about the potential data will not yield the correct data. Thinking is only part of science; maybe even a small part. We don’t have enough proper data to come close to solving the death problem. And in the case of living organisms, most of these experiments take calendar time. They take years, or months, or at least days, to get results. Thinkism may be instant for a super AI, but experimental results are not instant.

Interesting argument, and well-phrased.

But what about that recent story of a Cornell researcher Hod Lipson’s AI program that independently derived the laws of motion based on the swings of a pendulum, “a feat that took physicists centuries to complete”? According to Kelly’s thinkism hypothesis, that should be impossible.

And Lipson’s program is just the start of a whole field:

The research is being heralded as a potential breakthrough for science in the Petabyte Age, where computers try to find regularities in massive datasets that are too big and complex for the human mind. (See Wired magazine’s July 2008 cover story on “The End of Science.”)

Surely intelligence can achieve a lot. Solutions which take certain thinkers years to discover are uncovered in a short period of time by gifted experts. It is wrong to place solid limits on what a superior intelligence could do — could chimps predict what humans would be capable of with thinking alone? Of course, I could be wrong. Any intelligence might require extensive experimentation to generate knowledge. But the difference between my and Kelly’s position is that he sets hard limits based on speculating about intelligence fundamentally different than his own, while I acknowledge my basic uncertainty and say that I’m not entirely sure what thought alone is capable of. It could be capable of nearly everything, or it could only be capable of what it has achieved so far (a lot).

The conservative stance would be to assume that a new mind might be able to benefit from thought a great deal, and as such we should take great pains to ensure that all artificial intelligences above a certain level have human-friendly motivations. The “we have nothing to worry about, I guarantee it” stance would be to assume that thought is practically useless without thorough experimentation and to ignore the issue of human-friendly motivations on the pretense of indefinite human superiority and control. Sounds like the premise for yet another science fiction film where AIs get the jump on humans because we were overconfident.

Even if experimentation were required to glean knowledge, why would such experimentation be limited by the anthropocentric designation of “calendar time”? A nanoscale pendulum swinging in a vacuum demonstrate the same laws of motion as a large pendulum, and does so in a fraction of the time.

The human brain operates at about 200 Hz. Imagine hypothetical alien cultures where creatures evolved to have brains operating at 20 Hz or 2,000 Hz. Why would their advancement of science necessarily be limited by the “calendar time” of another intelligent species in an insignificant corner of the Milky Way Galaxy? Why would the limitations on knowledge to be gained from experiments be perfectly aligned with the inherent neural firing rates and “calendar time” of Homo sapiens? This is the Copernican Error of human-centrism — “if we’re a certain way, every other possible mind will have the same limitations, guaranteed”.

There are a variety of ways to boost one’s experimental output and data input. One obvious method is parallelism. Humans can only focus on one thing at a time, but an AI mind could focus on an unlimited number of experiments as long as it has the computing power and hardware. Another method would be miniaturization. The use of microarrays in biology research has made possible far less expensive and far more parallel experimentation than ever before.

I see Kelly’s position as anthropocentric triumphalism — we’re the greatest, no one can be as good as us, we have nothing to fear from a hard takeoff, any AI mind will need to engage in centuries of research to get as far as us. Sure, it might turn out to be true, but why put the human species on the line for this hypothesis?