Experimental Support for Monkey Self-Agency Thursday, Jul 7 2011 

For a contemporary press release relevant to my recent debate with Alex Knapp, “Rhesus monkeys have a form of self awareness not previously attributed to them”:

In the first study of its kind in an animal species that has not passed a critical test of self-recognition, cognitive psychologist Justin J. Couchman of the University at Buffalo has demonstrated that rhesus monkeys have a sense of self-agency — the ability to understand that they are the cause of certain actions — and possess a form of self awareness previously not attributed to them.

The study, which will be published July 6 in Biology Letters, a journal of the Royal Society, may illuminate apparent self-awareness deficits in humans with autism, schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease and developmental disabilities.
Rhesus monkeys are one of the best-known species of Old World monkeys, and have been used extensively in medical and biological research aimed at creating vaccines for rabies, smallpox and polio and drugs to manage HIV/AIDS; analyzing stem cells and sequencing the genome. Humans have sent them into space, cloned them and planted jellyfish genes in them.

Couchman, a PhD candidate at UB, is an instructor at UB and at the State University of New York College at Fredonia. He points out that previous research has shown that rhesus monkeys, like apes and dolphins, have metacognition, or the ability to monitor their own mental states. Nevertheless, the monkeys consistently fail the mirror self-recognition test, which assesses whether animals can recognize themselves in a mirror, and this is an important measure self-awareness.

“We know that in humans, the sense of self-agency is closely related to self-awareness,” Couchman says, “and that it results from monitoring the relationship between pieces of intentional, sensorimotor and perceptual information.
“Based on previous findings in comparative metacognition research, we thought that even though they fail the mirror test, rhesus monkeys might have some other form of self-awareness. In this study we looked at whether the monkeys have a sense of self agency, that is, the understanding that some actions are the consequence of their own intentions.”

Continued.

Thiel Foundation Press Release Quotes Leaders of Singularity Institute, Halcyon Molecular Thursday, Sep 30 2010 

The Thiel Foundation recently formally announced the “20 Under 20″ initiative:

SAN FRANCISCO, Sept. 29 /PRNewswire/ — Warning that America’s long-term economic prospects are uncertain without radical innovation in technology, Peter Thiel this week launched the Thiel Fellowship to foster the next generation of tech visionaries.

“Our world needs more breakthrough technologies,” said Thiel. “From Facebook to SpaceX to Halcyon Molecular, some of the world’s most transformational technologies were created by people who stopped out of school because they had ideas that couldn’t wait until graduation. This fellowship will encourage the most brilliant and promising young people not to wait on their ideas, either. The Thiel Fellows will change the world and call it a senior thesis.”

The Thiel Foundation will award 20 people under 20 years old cash grants of $100,000 to further their innovative scientific and technical ideas. In addition, over a two year period, Peter Thiel’s network of tech entrepreneurs and philanthropists—drawn from PayPal, Facebook, Palantir Technologies, Founders Fund, the Singularity Institute, and others—will teach the recipients about creating disruptive technologies and offer mentorship, employment opportunities, support, and training.

Young geniuses — that’s where it’s at! Untie their hands financially and academically, and they will do great things.

Michael Vassar’s Google TechTalk Monday, Aug 23 2010 

Over at Singularity Hub, Aaron Saenz is gushing over Michael Vassar’s Google TechTalk.

Aaron said:

Vassar is the president of the Singularity Institute and a prominent advocate for the belief that technologies may develop exponentially in the future.

Not really… my understanding is that the reason that Michael V. talks about the Enlightenment a lot is that he thinks that was the last major boost in human understanding and reason. He tends to focus more on human thinking than on our technologies, and sees the latter as an outgrowth of the former. That’s the primary idea behind the Vingean Singularity as well. (Remember that one?)

One of the apparent purposes of Less Wrong is to start a new Enlightenment. The jury’s still out on that one, but it doesn’t hurt to try.

Which Consequentialism? Machine Ethics and Moral Divergence Thursday, Feb 4 2010 

Here’s a extended abstract presented at the 2009 Asia-Pacific Conference on Computing and Philosophy that is making the rounds. The point of the paper, which was written by Carl Shulman, Nick Tarleton, and Henrik Jonsson, is that consequentialism as commonly discussed has a number of “free variables” where intuitions disagree about the right values of these variables. Therefore, machine ethics should draw on the emerging field of moral psychology to figure out how to fill in these free variables. This point is plainly put in the title of one of the last sections, “Current moral theories are inadequate for machine ethics”.

A reply from UK philosopher David Pearce has recently been posted by Roko at Less Wrong. Roko points out that David is a moral realist, i.e., that he believes there is a fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.

My immediate response to David would be that I agree with him that superhappiness is possible and worth pursuing, but to say that the propositional content of goals does not matter for humans, AIs, or any sentient beings is going way too far. A world guided by happiness as the sole optimization criterion will eventually toss away moral complexity to become quadrillions-of-smiling-faces land. The world ought to be shaped by a complex optimization criterion, and David doesn’t really address this. I can only speculate that maybe he finds it hard to believe that sentient beings would discard complex propositional content in their morals. If a magical force preserves that complexity, that would be nice, but I prefer the approach where it is deliberately protected.

Smart Fraction Theory Thursday, Jan 28 2010 

Here is a paper from Talent Development and Excellence, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2009), “The impact of smart fractions, cognitive ability of politicians and average competence of peoples on social development”. Abstract:

Smart fraction theory supposes that gifted and talented persons are especially relevant for societal development. Using results for the 95th percentile from TIMSS 1995-2007, PISA 2000-2006 and PIRLS 2001-2006 we calculated an ability sum value (N=90 countries) for the upper level group (equivalent to a within country IQ-threshold of 125 or a student assessment score of 667) and compared its influence with the mean ability and the 5th percentile ability on wealth (GDP), patent rates, Nobel Prizes, numbers of scientists, political variables (government effectiveness, democracy, rule of law, political liberty), HIV, AIDS and homicide. Additionally, using information on school and professional education, we estimated the cognitive competence of political leaders in N=90 countries. Results of correlations, regression and path analyses generally show a larger impact of the smart fractions’ ability on positively valued outcomes than of the mean result or the 5th percentile fraction. The influence of the 5th percentile fraction on HIV, AIDS and homicide, however, was stronger. The intelligence of politicians was less important, a longitudinal crosslagged analysis could show a positive influence on the cognitive development of nations.

An interesting portion from the discussion:

The cognitive ability of political leaders is far less important. We could only find higher correlations to democracy and political liberty, in a longitudinal analysis democracy has a positive impact on cognitive ability of political leaders. People, if they have the chance to elect their leaders, prefer more educated ones. Political leaders have, in the long run, a positive influence on countries’ cognitive ability, presumedly by creating better educational and social environments increasing cognitive ability.

Tell us what you think if you read the whole thing.

Learning Styles Challenged Monday, Dec 21 2009 

From Eurekalert:

Learning styles challenged
There is no evidence supporting auditory and visual learning, psychologists say

Are you a verbal learner or a visual learner? Chances are, you’ve pegged yourself or your children as either one or the other and rely on study techniques that suit your individual learning needs. And you’re not alone— for more than 30 years, the notion that teaching methods should match a student’s particular learning style has exerted a powerful influence on education. The long-standing popularity of the learning styles movement has in turn created a thriving commercial market amongst researchers, educators, and the general public.

The wide appeal of the idea that some students will learn better when material is presented visually and that others will learn better when the material is presented verbally, or even in some other way, is evident in the vast number of learning-style tests and teaching guides available for purchase and used in schools. But does scientific research really support the existence of different learning styles, or the hypothesis that people learn better when taught in a way that matches their own unique style?

Unfortunately, the answer is no, according to a major new report published this month in Psychological Science in the Public Interest, a journal of the Association for Psychological Science. The report, authored by a team of eminent researchers in the psychology of learning—Hal Pashler (University of San Diego), Mark McDaniel (Washington University in St. Louis), Doug Rohrer (University of South Florida), and Robert Bjork (University of California, Los Angeles)—reviews the existing literature on learning styles and finds that although numerous studies have purported to show the existence of different kinds of learners (such as “auditory learners” and “visual learners”), those studies have not used the type of randomized research designs that would make their findings credible.

Unfortunately, in psychology, empirical verification is not a high priority, while making stuff up that sounds good is. In psychology, it seems as if the heuristic “if SWPLs find it emotionally uplifting, it’s probably wrong” works well. At least that’s what I’m coming to believe.

My Occam’s razor hypothesis to explain the “learning styles” myth is that dumber people learn better with pictures, while smarter people can learn effectively from both pictures and text. This hypothesis is backed up by centuries of traditional wisdom, and it ought to be experimentally tested. By calling dumber people “visual learners” and smarter people “verbal learners” (though they probably learn from pictures better than the former group as well), you get to be more polite, though wrong.

IQ: “Lonely Ice Floe” or Consensus Science? Wednesday, Dec 9 2009 

Malcolm Gladwell calls those who accept the Mainstream Science on Intelligence statement “IQ fundamentalists”, but the reality of g and the predictive validity of intelligence tests are widely accepted as consensus science by intelligence researchers, with some caveats. Reading Eurekalert and PhysOrg, I see press releases practically every day that analyze the correlation of intelligence with a variety of genetic and environmental factors. Here’s one from yesterday:

Fit teenage boys are smarter
But muscle strength isn’t the secret, study shows

In the first study to demonstrate a clear positive association between adolescent fitness and adult cognitive performance, Nancy Pedersen of the University of Southern California and colleagues in Sweden find that better cardiovascular health among teenage boys correlates to higher scores on a range of intelligence tests – and more education and income later in life.

“During early adolescence and adulthood, the central nervous system displays considerable plasticity,” said Pedersen, research professor of psychology at the USC College of Letters, Arts & Sciences. “Yet, the effect of exercise on cognition remains poorly understood.”

Pedersen, lead author Maria Åberg of the University of Gothenburg and the research team looked at data for all 1.2 million Swedish men born between 1950 and 1976 who enlisted for mandatory military service at the age of 18.

In every measure of cognitive functioning they analyzed – from verbal ability to logical performance to geometric perception to mechanical skills – average test scores increased according to aerobic fitness.

However, scores on intelligence tests did not increase along with muscle strength, the researchers found.

“Positive associations with intelligence scores were restricted to cardiovascular fitness, not muscular strength,” Pedersen explained, “supporting the notion that aerobic exercise improved cognition through the circulatory system influencing brain plasticity.”

I support the consensus science on intelligence for the sake of promoting truth, but I also must admit that it especially concerns me that the modern denial of the reality of different intelligence levels will cause ethicists and the public to ignore the risks from human-equivalent artificial intelligence. After all, if all human beings are on the same general level of intelligence, plus or minus a few assorted strengths and weaknesses, then it becomes easy to deny that superintelligence is even theoretically possible.

Some people are just more intelligent than others in every possible way. (Though most people have strengths that others don’t, such as through learning and talent.) This sounds unfair and politically incorrect, but that’s what we see in the data. The modern neo-mystical pseudoscientific folk view of intelligence seems to indicate that if someone seems genuinely more intelligent at first, that intelligence must surely be accompanied by some major flaws, to “balance it out” on the cosmic scale. This may be true sometimes — for instance, nerds tend to have poorer social skills than average — but it doesn’t always apply. Some people are just better at everything. This sort of talk is often considered forgivable when people mention it casually in real life in relation to a specific circumstance, but for some reason when it is put down in text in general terms, would-be egalitarians try to shoot holes in it with unscientific theories like Gardner’s multiple intelligences concept.

Roko: “It is probably not too much of an exaggeration to say that building a superintelligent computer program is like building a god” Monday, Dec 7 2009 

Roko on artificial intelligence in his latest Good article:

Computers that can behave intelligently and rewrite their own code could be dangerous in ways that are not at all obvious to their creators. The codebreaker scenario outlined above is an example of a hard takeoff event—where a smarter-than-human AI quickly (in a matter of hours or months) takes control of the entire world and utilizes all the resources in the world to achieve whatever goal it has been programmed with. Whether such a hard-takeoff scenario is likely has been disputed; however, the ability of a smarter-than-human intelligence to surprise us shouldn’t be underestimated.

In the next Good piece we will be positive for a change — I will summarize the potential benefits of successful friendly AI.

Gladwell: Pinker, Round Two Tuesday, Dec 1 2009 

Here’s Gladwell’s latest response to Pinker’s critique.

Unsurprisingly, his arguments are based on guilt by association rather than presenting evidence in favor of his view.

On Gardner’s Multiple Intelligences Saturday, Nov 28 2009 

As somewhat of an aside, Mr. Lynch criticized my critique of Gardner’s theory of “multiple intelligences” as “irreverent”. This is extremely unfair. All I said was that his theory is “something that doesn’t stand up to scientific scrutiny.” I criticize an ad hoc, unscientific theory that has practically no empirical evidence to support it, and the popular appeal of which derives entirely from its egalitarian and inclusive political flavor, and get called irreverent.

Calling Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences unscientific is not even nearly the most irreverent thing I’ve said, by a long shot. It shouldn’t even be considered irreverent, period. Theories of this sort, which have great popular appeal to the public and practically zero appeal to cognitive psychologists, should be regarded as guilty before proven innocent. Skepticism should be our default mode. Rain on as many unscientific parades as you can.

Stephen Pinker Responds to Malcolm Gladwell Thursday, Nov 19 2009 

Here is the exchange of letters. Pinker’s response:

What Malcolm Gladwell calls a “lonely ice floe” is what psychologists call “the mainstream.” In a 1997 editorial in the journal Intelligence, 52 signatories wrote, “I.Q. is strongly related, probably more so than any other single measurable human trait, to many important educational, occupational, economic and social outcomes.” Similar conclusions were affirmed in a unanimous blue-ribbon report by the American Psychological Association, and in recent studies (some focusing on outliers) by Dean Simonton, David Lubinski and others.

Gladwell is right, of course, to privilege peer-reviewed articles over blogs. But sports is a topic in which any academic must answer to an army of statistics-savvy amateurs, and in this instance, I judged, the bloggers were correct. They noted, among other things, that Berri and Simmons weakened their “weak correlation” (Gladwell described it in the New Yorker essay reprinted in “What the Dog Saw” as “no connection”) by omitting the lower-drafted quarterbacks who, unsurprisingly, turned out not to merit many plays. In any case, the relevance to teacher selection (the focus of the essay) remains tenuous.

Why is Gladwell so damn defensive in his response? On his blog, he went to call one of Pinker’s sources, Steve Sailer, a racist, while the issue at hand was the value of performance indicators for football players. It is because he knows that he is finally being called out in a big way, this time by someone who carries significantly more weight than Richard Posner (an earlier critic) in the scientific community — Pinker.

For some cringe-worthy profiles and interviews with Gladwell, see “Geek Pop Star” by New York magazine, “Author Malcolm Gladwell” at Time, a profile at Wired, and a review at The Guardian. A truly painful profile of Gladwell from Fast Company in 2007 is also available. Why do business people fall for this crap?

On the other side of the fence, the December 2009 issue of Vanity Fair has a mocking article on Gladwell. It is funny that Vanity Fair is one of the publications to see through his superficiality, whereas ostensibly more intelligent publications like TIME, Wired, and Fast Company fail terribly.

In the end, it is Gladwell that is on a lonely ice floe, and he knows it. He probably knows that the literature doesn’t back him up, but like so many others, is in denial about IQ because of its political incorrectness. I am optimistic, however. As we gain powerful new experimental tools over the coming decades, we will be able to investigate the brain and mind in much greater detail and the truth will become too obvious to ignore.

It looks like Gladwell didn’t pay attention to the eleventh virtue of rationality — scholarship. If he spent less time traveling around giving talks, attending parties, and reading fluffy fiction, he might get some actual studies done. I mean, if I were making $40,000 per talk, I might fall a bit behind on my studies too, but 9 years of it? You have enough to live, man — why not read an article from Intelligence once in a while?

Why I Care About Malcolm Gladwell’s Igon Values Wednesday, Nov 18 2009 

Why do I care so much about the Malcolm Gladwell issue? First is the matter of scientific integrity in journalism. Science-oriented folks care about it, and most everyone else doesn’t. For instance, here is John Horgan from Slate:

Almost four years ago, an esteemed science journalist — OK, it was me — suggested that the days of truly momentous scientific discovery might be over. One symptom of science’s plight, I predicted, would be that my fellow science writers would become increasingly desperate for and willing to invent “revolutionary” theories. To my delight, Malcolm Gladwell has provided the most spectacular confirmation of my hypothesis to date.

Compare this to the Columbia Journalism Review:

The answer to this charge is: Of course Gladwell lacks rigor – he’s a feature writer, not a brain scientist. Why some people – including the corporate titans who pay Gladwell’s speaking fees – seem confused about this I haven’t a clue. I can’t also help but wonder what would prompt the Times to haul out the heavy gun that is Pinker to shoot down a collection of magazine miscellany.

The reason why is that the way in which we think about probability and statistics determines the way we model the world, and the way we model the world profoundly effects the way we think, behave, and solve problems. A faulty map, like the kind that Gladwell spreads to millions of powerful and wealthy people, causes us to collectively trip and fall in the territory. The only problem is that the more of us use the faulty map, the easier it is to write off our faulty navigation based on uncontrolled external factors. This is groupthink on a stupendous scale. We have trouble identifying our mistakes if we all make them in the same way.

I am not a scientist. I didn’t even attend college for more than a few classes. I don’t pretend to be a scientist, but I do form science-based opinions based on the results reported by real scientists, whom I admire. But the real people with power in this world are journalists and politicians, not scientists. As an online journalist/intellectual type with more than 1,500 short popsci articles under my belt, I see my task as spreading scientific literacy to as many people as possible, and by extension the people in power, so they can make decisions based on empirical evidence and not folk theories. I see a responsibility to scientists and researchers to absorb as much of their material as I can and translate it into non-specialist language that any educated person can digest.

Malcolm Gladwell breaks that responsibility. Instead of trying to be interesting while being factual, he arbitrarily makes up counterintuitive ideas and then cherry-picks anecdotes and evidence to support them. This makes a mockery of science. I was shocked to see unscientific language being used in a review of What the Dog Saw (Gladwell’s latest book) for my city’s newspaper, the San Francisco Chronicle:

The book – divided into three sections on minor geniuses, intriguing theories and personality analysis – is grounded on a bedrock of strong character portraits.

What the hell? A bedrock of… character portraits? Character portraits form a bedrock? This is a very low intellectual standard.

What is the alternative to character portraits? Well, studies that record the intelligence testing results of many tens of thousands of people and follow up on additional traits such as job performance, trainability, delinquency rates, vocabulary understanding, ability to deal with unexpected situations, identification of problems, dealing with orders, and a huge library of other g-loaded tasks, to give one example. Where does this wealth of information come from? To quote Gottfredson 1997:

Civil rights law and regulation have led many employers in recent decades to scrutinize more carefully the validity of their selection procedures (Sharf, 1988). They have also prompted a sometimes desperate search for less g-loaded selection procedures (procedures less highly correlated with intelligence) in order to reduce disparate impact of selection devices on minority hiring and thus employers’ vulnerability to employment discrimination lawsuits (Gottfredson & Sharf, 1988). As a result, there now exists a very large body of evidence concerning the predictive validity of various mental aptitudes, personality traits, and physical capabilities (e.g., see Gottfredson, 1986b; J. Hogan, 1991; R. Hogan, 1991; Landy, Shankster, & Kohler, 1994; Lubinski & Dawis, 1992; Schmidt, Ones, & Hunter, 1992; Stokes, Mumford, & Owens, 1994). Many of these data have been metaanalyzed.

This data is all there, yet Gladwell writes that it is impossible to determine how good of a teacher someone will be from their intelligence tests, or how well a starting quarterback will perform based on their draft position. Actually, you can use these metrics — though the estimation will not be perfect, it’s almost always better than guessing without information. Here’s a couple more quotes on Gladwell from New York magazine’s book review:

Leon Wieseltier, the literary editor of The New Republic, has said, “What Gladwell is marketing is nothing but marketing—the marketer’s view of the world. But that view of the world is, I’m afraid, idiotic.” The judge and legal scholar Richard Posner, in a scathing review of Blink for TNR, complained that it was “written like a book intended for people who do not read books.”

In a marketer’s view of the world, science doesn’t really matter. If it helps you sell something, great, otherwise, who cares?

There will probably always be marketers writing books on marketing. What is scary is when these marketing books acquire a vague scientific veneer that sends them screaming to the top of bestsellers lists. Most marketing books are complete, utter fluff — the reason that Gladwell does better than his competitors is that non-scientists can understand his work and consider it scientifically informed on some level. Back to Janet Maslin’s “Mr. Gladwell has a great penchant for quantifiable data.”

The first issue, which I’ve just described, is a conflict between Gladwell and established science on intelligence. But what concerns me even more is deeper. It’s a conflict between Gladwell and Bayesian reasoning itself. Instead of thinking about something and carefully considering all sides of an issue, Gladwell advocates making decisions in the time it takes to blink. This strategy can work alright for tasks like facial recognition, but in complex situations, it becomes worse than useless. Piles upon piles of scientific studies of human decision-making have determined that going with our “gut feeling” often leads straight down the rabbit hole to Fail-Land.

Reading Pinker’s article, I figured that his main qualm with Gladwell — also mine — is that Gladwell urinates all over statistical analysis just because it’s not perfect. (Implementing a true Bayesian rationalist would require infinite computing power.) Pinker’s most important points are at the top of the second page of his review. The page that most clearly elucidates Pinker’s motivation — and sheds light on the entire article and what the conflict is really about, which I’d wager 90% of the commenters on the issue haven’t realized yet because they think the issue is more about pretending you’re an expert than using flawed statistical reasoning that rots the core of our society — is a short piece published by the editors of the newspaper on how the idea for the review began:

Malcolm Gladwell recently said that if he were trying to break into journalism today, he would start by getting a master’s degree in statistics. The Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker, who reviews Gladwell’s “What the Dog Saw” on this week’s cover, might second this advice. Asked via e-mail what is the most important scientific concept that lay people fail to understand, he responded: “Statistical reasoning. A difficulty in grasping probability underlies fallacies from medical quackery and stock-market scams to misinterpreting sex differences and the theory of evolution.”

Difficulty in grasping probability is another way of saying difficulty in following the axioms of probability theory, which is another way of saying difficulty in using Bayesian reasoning. The axioms of probability theory are here to stay. They seem even more fundamental than the laws of physics. Try to fight probability theory, and you will eventually lose.

There’s a problem with probability theory: it’s not sexy. Humans do not follow it at the conscious level very frequently because evolution is a lazy designer that follows a “good enough” philosophy of organism-making. So, there are two choices — attempt to twist our minds into a configuration that follows probability theory more faithfully, or accept nonsense that makes us feel good. Most people who have this choice choose the latter. Twisting is difficult, but ultimately necessary, and with brain-computer interfacing it will eventually become much easier.

One of the fundamental ideas in Bayesian probability theory is that you assign prior probabilities to different possibilities based on prior knowledge. Gladwell is arguing that we throw away explicit priors and trust our gut, or assign all mutually exclusive future possibilities an equal probability weighting. Yet, that is just another type of prior — one conveniently supplied at the subconscious level by our Bayesian brains. Now, it may be, in some cases, that the “hidden prior” that exists in our brains might be superior to a hastily assembled explicit prior, especially for tasks for which there was a strong selection pressure and evolution has a strong incentive for not messing up — like facial recognition. For evolutionarily novel decision problems, such as judging the predictive value of IQ tests, forget it. We have to follow the data and see what it says, because our personal opinions are untrustworthy. Gladwell’s habit of throwing away predictive indicators altogether will do us absolutely no good.

As we head into a dangerous period of technological development, it is more important than ever to be educated about statistical reasoning. Cognitive biases like scope neglect — behaving the same way whether 1,000 or 1,000,000 lives are at sake — will be our downfall if we aren’t careful. Our “downfall” could be our literal extinction, from molecular nanotechnology, AI, or synthetic biology, as Bill Joy pointed out in his famous article.

The statistical ignorance that Pinker rails against ties in to why some people think that AI is straight-up impossible or implausibly difficult — they view their own intelligence as a magical engine (the holistic view) rather than a large number of individually uninteresting but collectively powerful prediction and control algorithms (a reductionist view). Statistical analysis and decision theory still has a ways to go before creating AGI (in my view), but part of the reason why some people think that AGI is centuries off is that the achievements that these fields have already produced have gone under-recognized and unregarded by some of the best-selling authors of our time. Some of these authors will continue ignoring the power of statistical reasoning right up until the day a Bayesian AGI walks right up to them and shakes their hand.

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